HOW NOT TO INTERPRET THE FIDIC DISPUTES CLAUSE: THE SINGAPORE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT IN PERSERO

CHRISTOPHER R SEPPÄLA*

Partner, White & Case LLP, Paris
Special Adviser, FIDIC Contracts Committee

I. INTRODUCTION

As a result of the recent decision of the Court of Appeal of Singapore (the “CA” or the “Court”) in GRW Joint Operation v. Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK1 (the “Persero case”), which dismissed an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Singapore setting aside an International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration award, there has been increased uncertainty about the effect of a “binding”, but not “final”, decision of a DAB under the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Construction, 1999 (the “1999 Red Book”).2 The ICC Arbitral Tribunal in that case, on the one hand, and two Singapore courts, on the other hand, arrived at widely different interpretations of sub-clauses 20.4 to 20.7 of the 1999 Red Book.

In light of this uncertainty, and given that I have been involved in the review and drafting of the disputes clause in the 1999 Red Book since the Fourth Edition was published in 1987, I would like to comment on these decisions, specifically the CA judgment, as it is the last—and final—word from Singapore.3

Accordingly, in this article I will briefly review the facts of the Persero case (Section II), the ICC arbitration and award (Section III) and the judgments of the High Court (“HC”) and the CA in Singapore (Section IV). I will then comment on the CA decision (Section V), before drawing some conclusions (Section VI).

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* The views expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the law firm or organisation, such as FIDIC, with which he is affiliated. The author is grateful to Matthew Secomb and Diana Bowman, his colleagues at White & Case LLP, Paris, for their comments on this paper in draft. However, only the author is responsible for its contents.


2 The Court of Appeal is Singapore’s highest court.
II. THE FACTS

In 2006 PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) TBK, a publicly owned Indonesian company ("PGN"), and CRW Joint Operation, an Indonesian joint operation ("CRW"), entered into a contract pursuant to which CRW undertook to design, procure, install, test and pre-commission a pipeline in Indonesia. The contract was based on the 1999 Red Book, with modifications which are not relevant here, and was expressed to be governed by Indonesian law.

During the performance of the contract, CRW had submitted 13 "Variation Order Proposals" ("VOPs") to PGN but the parties could not agree on their valuation. Accordingly, the parties referred their dispute to a single-person Dispute Adjudication Board ("DAB") which, on 25 November 2008, awarded a sum of US$17,298,834.57 to CRW in respect of the VOPs. (The DAB was also termed the "Adjudicator" by the CA.) A day or two later,⁴ PGN issued a notice of dissatisfaction ("NOD") with the decision.

By a letter dated 3 December 2008, CRW demanded prompt adherence to the DAB's decision and served an invoice on PGN for its amount but PGN rejected the invoice and disavowed any obligation to pay it.⁵

III. THE ICC ARBITRATION AND AWARD

On 17 February 2009,⁶ CRW filed a Request for Arbitration with the ICC (beginning ICC case No 16122), pursuant to sub-clause 20.6 of the 1999 Red Book "for the sole purpose of giving prompt effect to the Adjudicator's decision"?⁷

Thereafter, PGN filed an Answer to the Request for Arbitration claiming that the DAB decision was not yet final and binding because PGN had issued a NOD and, thus, PGN was not obliged to make payment. PGN also contended—as a defence—that, pursuant to sub-clause 20.6, the DAB decision ought to be reopened by an arbitral award and CRW's request for prompt payment be rejected.⁸ PGN did not file a counterclaim with its Answer.⁹

The Arbitral Tribunal comprised Mr Alan J Thambiyah, Chairman, Mr Neil Kaplan and Professor H Pryatna Abdurrašid.¹⁰ The place of arbitration was Singapore and the proceedings were conducted in English.

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⁴ The judgment of the HC dated 20 July 2010 (the "HC Judgment") (para. 4) says 26 November 2008 whereas the judgment dated 13 July 2011 of the Court of Appeal (the "CA judgment") (para. 7) says 28 November 2008.
⁵ Award, dated 24 November 2009 (the "Award"), subparas. 4 and 5 of para. 19.
⁶ Award, [14]. The CA judgment says 13 February 2009 (para. 9).
⁷ CA judgment, [9].
⁸ ibid.
⁹ Pursuant to Art 5.5 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration, if the respondent has a counterclaim, it is required to file the same with its Answer.
¹⁰ CA judgment, [10].
The Tribunal identified two questions for decision:

1. Whether the claimants (CRW) were entitled to immediate payment of the US$17,298,834.57, and
2. Whether the respondent (PGN) was entitled to request the Tribunal, pursuant to sub-clause 20.6, to open up, review and revise the DAB’s decision or any certificate upon which it was based.

The Tribunal stated that the main issue in contention between the parties was the “meaning and effect of the following sentence appearing in the fourth paragraph of [sub-clause] 20.4”:

“The (DAB) decision shall be binding on both parties, who shall promptly give effect to it unless and until it shall be revised in an amicable settlement or an arbitral award as described below.”

In essence, the Tribunal stated that CRW’s case was that:

“. . . notwithstanding the NOD, the DAB decision, although it may not be ‘final’, is nonetheless binding on the Respondent who is obliged, by the express terms of sub-clause 20.4, to comply promptly with the DAB decision to make immediate payment of the sum of US$17,298,834.57 to the Claimants.”

On the other hand, PGN claimed that the NOD was served in compliance with the contract, that the DAB decision was not an arbitral award enforceable under applicable law, that the DAB decision contained errors and that it would be unfair to enforce it until those errors had been examined by the Tribunal. PGN denied that it was in breach of contract in not paying the DAB decision because the decision was not final and binding. PGN argued further that the Arbitral Tribunal was at liberty to examine and determine the dispute and should not do so based merely on the DAB decision but also on other material to be adduced by the parties relating to the alleged errors in that decision.

With respect to the first question identified above, a majority of the arbitrators (the “Majority Members”) concluded that the service of a NOD did not alter the fact that the DAB’s decision was binding on PGN and that it had an obligation to pay CRW immediately the amount of US$17,298,834.57.

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11 Award, [17]. These are identified in the award as “preliminary” issues, though it is unclear why. Possibly, at this stage the parties (it was before the Terms of Reference under Art 18 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration had been signed) the Tribunal was not yet aware of the scope of the arbitration.
12 Award, [17].
13 Award, [26].
14 Award, [28].
15 Award, [31].
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 This is the term used in the CA judgment, para. 1, and it will therefore be used here.
19 Award, [45].
As to the second question (i.e., whether PGN was entitled to request the Arbitral Tribunal to open up, review and revise the DAB decision), the Majority Members answered this in the negative as PGN had not served any counterclaim. However, in their award—a final award—they also reserved PGN's right "to commence arbitration proceedings claiming the opening up, review and revision of the DAB decision dated 25 November 2008".

IV. THE SETTING ASIDE OF THE AWARD

A. The HC decision

PGN applied to the HC to have the award set aside in Singapore on several grounds, including Article 34 (2) (a) (iii) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (adopted in Singapore), which provides that an arbitral award may be set aside if "the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration . . . ."

The HC found that the Majority Members had exceeded the scope of the arbitration provisions in two respects.

First, the HC found that they had issued an award on a dispute which had not been referred to the DAB. The HC said that the opening words of sub-clause 20.6 require that a dispute be previously submitted to the DAB before it can be submitted to arbitration. According to the HC, the dispute regarding the immediate enforceability of the DAB's decision had not been submitted to the DAB. Indeed, the HC noted that CRW had itself characterised PGN's non-payment of the DAB decision as a "second" dispute, as distinguished from the first dispute concerning whether CRW was entitled to payment for the VOPs.

Secondly, even if the second dispute was referable to arbitration, the HC found that sub-clause 20.6 "does not allow an arbitral tribunal to make final a binding DAB decision without hearing the merits of that DAB decision".

Accordingly, the HC found that the Majority Members had exceeded their powers under the arbitration agreement (sub-clauses 20.4 to 20.7) and set aside the Award on the basis of Article 34 (2) (a) (iii).

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20 Award, [48] to [52]. PGN had relied upon sub-clause 20.6 solely as a defence.
21 Award, [52]. Professor Abdurrasyid, the other arbitrator, issued a dissenting opinion, dated 26 November 2009, emphasising that the DAB had failed to apply Indonesian law, the governing law of the contract, and that it also awarded CRW money in excess of the amount claimed.
22 "Unless settled amicably, any dispute in respect of which the DAB's decision (if any) has not become final and binding shall be finally settled by international arbitration."
23 HC judgment, [30].
24 HC judgment, [35]. See also [37].
The judgment of the HC, which was handed down on 20 July 2010, was followed almost one year later, on 13 July 2011, by the judgment of the CA. Therefore, it is unnecessary to devote any more attention to the judgment of the HC, except to note its argument that the arbitrators had issued an award on a dispute which had not been referred to the DAB.

There is no indication in the award that this argument had been raised before the Arbitral Tribunal. This argument may have arisen before the HC because, as mentioned above, CRW had itself characterised PGN’s non-payment of the DAB’s decision as a “second” dispute distinct from the one referred to the DAB. In the author’s view, at least absent CRW’s concession, this ground for the HC’s decision is questionable and the CA, rightly, did not adopt it in its judgment.

As a practical matter, is a dispute over the enforcement of a DAB’s decision to be distinguished from one over the merits of that decision? Can they not as easily be characterised as just one dispute? Unless CRW abandoned its claim, was it really likely to consider the dispute with PGN to have been finally resolved before it had been paid? Even the HC itself appeared to recognise—somewhat inconsistently—that there was only one “real dispute”: “the real dispute was clearly whether the DAB Decision was correct and, following that, whether CRW was entitled to the payment of the sum which the DAB had decided was due.”

As to the second ground (sub-clause 20.6 required the Arbitral Tribunal to consider the merits), this can be considered in the discussion below of the CA’s judgment as the CA adopts the same position.

B. The CA decision

On 13 July 2011, the CA dismissed the appeal, thus upholding the HC’s decision to set aside the award, but it did so on somewhat different grounds from those relied upon by the HC.

Arguably, therefore, this argument could be deemed to have been waived by virtue of Art 33 (entitled “Waiver”) of the ICC Rules.

CRW may have done so to avoid any suggestion that it was questioning its entitlement to the amount of the DAB’s decision.

Moreover,

(1) a central purpose of the DAB procedure is to provide the contractor, principally, with an expeditious dispute resolution procedure in exchange, in part, for his commitment to proceed with the works without interruption, see sub-clauses 8.1, second paragraph, and 20.6, last sentence, and

(2) yet, any reference back to the DAB is likely to set back the commencement of arbitration, as Mr Gillon again notes (Gillon, op. cit. n. 2, p. 410), by four to five months, as well as to be futile (as Mr Gillon recognises on pp. 401 and 402), as the DAB would almost certainly find that its “binding” decision should be enforced.

In short, the essential purpose of clause 20—providing for the expeditious resolution of disputes—is undermined by such a formalistic interpretation, without there being any obvious countervailing benefit.

With respect, the author maintains that the CA made four errors which undermine the value of the CA’s judgment. The CA:

1. failed to understand what the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed to decide;
2. misinterpreted sub-clause 20.7;
3. misinterpreted sub-clause 20.6 in three respects; and
4. misinterpreted the effect of the Award.

Each of these errors is discussed below.

I. The CA failed to understand what the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed to decide

The CA begins its reasoning by considering what matters the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed to decide.

CRW maintained that the ambit of the arbitration was “limited to giving prompt effect to the [Adjudicator’s] [d]ecision”. 50 On the other hand, PGN argued that it had no obligation to pay the amount awarded because it had validly submitted a NOD, which rendered the decision “not yet final and binding”. 51 PGN contended that, therefore, the Arbitral Tribunal should open up, review and revise the decision on the merits and that the Arbitral Tribunal “[could] not and [should] not deliberate the current dispute merely based on [the Adjudicator’s] [d]ecision”. 52

The CA addressed this issue by reference to the Terms of Reference (“TOR”) that the parties and members of the Arbitral Tribunal had signed pursuant to Article 18 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration (the “ICC Rules”). According to the CA:

“The TOR stated clearly that the Arbitration was commenced pursuant to sub-cl 20.6 of the 1999 FIDIC Conditions of Contract. Further, it is plain that under the TOR, the Arbitral Tribunal was, by the parties’ consent, conferred an unfettered discretion to reopen and review each and every finding by the Adjudicator. In other words, the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed to decide not only whether CRW was entitled to immediate payment of the sum of US$17,298,834.57 . . . but also ‘any additional issues of fact or law which the Arbitral Tribunal, in its own discretion, might deem necessary to decide for the purpose of rendering its arbitral award’. With this crucial factual backdrop in mind, we now turn to consider Issue 2 . . .” 53 [Emphasis added.]

This passage indicates that the CA believed that, as the arbitration had been begun under sub-clause 20.6 then, because of the wording of the TOR, the Arbitral Tribunal was conferred “unfettered discretion” to exercise the powers that an arbitral tribunal has under sub-clause 20.6 to “open up, review and revise . . . any decision of the DAB . . .”

50 CA judgment, [41].
51 CA judgment, [42].
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid. [43].
However, while undoubtedly an arbitral tribunal potentially has such powers under sub-clause 20.6, the extent to which they may be exercised in any given ICC arbitration depends upon the claims and counterclaims, if any, which the parties have asserted in, and the contents of the TOR drawn up for, that arbitration.\textsuperscript{33}

In this case, CRW sought immediate payment of the DAB’s decision whereas PGN asserted no counterclaim. While the CA was correct that the Tribunal was entitled by Part VII of the TOR—which the CA quotes at the beginning of its judgment\textsuperscript{34}—to decide “any additional issues of fact or law which the Arbitral Tribunal, in its own discretion, [might] deem necessary” etc., this was qualified, at the beginning of the sentence, by the words “[s]ubject to Article 19 of the ICC Rules [of Arbitration]”, which the CA appears simply to ignore.\textsuperscript{35}

Article 19 of the ICC Rules provides that a party may not make a new claim outside the limits of the TOR without authorisation from the Arbitral Tribunal. The only claim in the arbitration, as the CA recognises in its judgment,\textsuperscript{36} is CRW’s claim for an award to enforce the DAB’s decision, inasmuch as PGN had filed no counterclaim.\textsuperscript{37} Consequently, any additional issues of fact or law had to relate to CRW’s claim—the only claim in the arbitration—or the defences or pleadings relating to that claim, given the prohibition on new claims (except where authorised by the Arbitral Tribunal) in Article 19. The Tribunal was only empowered to enforce or deny that claim.

Accordingly, having overlooked the import of the words “[s]ubject to Article 19 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration”, the CA misunderstood the scope of what the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed to decide, which it refers to as a “crucial factual backdrop” for its decision.\textsuperscript{38} The Court concludes, wrongly, that under the TOR the Arbitral Tribunal had power—indeed, as we shall see, the Court says (again, mistakenly) the obligation—to open up,\textsuperscript{39} to...

\textsuperscript{33} In other words, sub-clause 20.6 needs to be read together with the ICC Rules of Arbitration to which it refers as well as the TOR for any given arbitration.

\textsuperscript{34} CA judgment, [9].

\textsuperscript{35} Part VII of the TOR reads in relevant part:

"VII. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED

['Subject to Article 19 of the ICC Rules (of Arbitration), the Arbitral Tribunal shall resolve all issues of fact and law arising from the claims and defences and pleadings as submitted by the Parties, including further submissions which are relevant to the merits of the Parties’ respective claims and defences, but not limited to, the following issues, as well as any additional issues of fact or law which the Arbitral Tribunal, in its own discretion, may deem necessary to decide for the purpose of rendering its arbitral award...'] [Emphasis added.]

\textsuperscript{36} CA judgment, [9].

\textsuperscript{37} This is also indicated by Part VIII (entitled “Estimated Amount in Dispute”) of the TOR quantifying the “total amount in dispute” as US$17,696,894.57 (CA judgment, [12]).

\textsuperscript{38} CA judgment, [48].
review and revise the DAB’s decision, whereas (as stated above) it only had in fact the power to enforce or deny CRW’s claim.

2. The CA misinterpreted sub-clause 20.7

After considering what the Arbitral Tribunal was appointed to decide, the Court examined the dispute resolution procedure under the 1999 Red Book. In doing so, the Court adopted the following interpretation by certain commentators on sub-clause 20.7 of the 1999 Red Book:

"Sub-Clause 20.7 only deals with the situation where both parties are satisfied with the DAB decision. If not (i.e., if a notice of dissatisfaction has been served), then there is no immediate recourse for the aggrieved party to ensure the DAB decision can be enforced." [Emphasis added.]

According to this interpretation, as sub-clause 20.7 provides for the referral of only a “final and binding” decision to arbitration for enforcement, a decision that is merely binding cannot be enforced by an arbitral award. However, as I believe the history of this sub-clause (and its predecessor) bears out, and as I have noted in an article published elsewhere, sub-clause 20.7 was not intended to be interpreted—and should not be interpreted—in this way.

It suffices to say here that sub-clause 20.7 is the successor of sub-clause 67.4 of the FIDIC Red Book, Fourth Edition, 1987, which was simply put into that form of contract to ensure that, where a party had failed to comply with a final and binding decision, such failure could be referred to

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39 Thus, later the CA remarks "an arbitration commenced under sub-cl. 20.6 constitutes a rehearing, which in turn allows the parties to have their dispute ‘finally settled’ in that arbitration. The Majority Members clearly ignored sub-cl. 20.6 (and, indeed, the TOR as a whole) . . . ", CA judgment. [82] [emphasis added]. See also CA judgment. [79] (“What the Majority Members ought to have done, in accordance with the TOR . . . was to make an interim award in favour of CRW . . . and then proceed to hear the parties’ substantive disputes afresh before making a final award.” [Emphasis by underlining added.])


41 Sub-clause 20.7 [Failure to Comply with Dispute Adjudication Board’s Decision], reads:

“In the event that:

(a) neither Party has given notice of dissatisfaction within the period stated in Sub-Clause 20.4 [Obtaining Dispute Adjudication Board’s Decision],

(b) the DAB’s related decision (if any) has become final and binding, and

(c) a Party fails to comply with this decision,

then the other Party may, without prejudice to any other rights it may have, refer the failure itself to arbitration under Sub-Clause 20.6 [Arbitration]. Sub-Clause 20.4 [Obtaining Dispute Adjudication Board’s Decision] and Sub-Clause 20.5 [Amicable Settlement] shall not apply to this reference.”

42 CA judgment. [55].

43 See the author’s article “Sub-Clause 20.7 of the FIDIC Red Book Does Not Justify Denying Enforcement of a ‘Binding’ DAB Decision” (based on a presentation given by the author at the FIDIC Users’ Conference in London on 1-2 December 2010), (2011) 6(5) Construction Law International (International Bar Association). In his article (op. cit n. 2, pp. 394-395), Mr Gillon describes the history of sub-clause 20.7 correctly, but gives no source for his description.
arbitration (as this previously had been unclear).\textsuperscript{44} Nothing was intended to be implied about merely a “binding” decision as it was obvious—or so it was thought—that, as such a decision had been the subject of a NOD, it could, together with the dispute underlying it, be referred to arbitration under sub-clause 67.3, the predecessor of sub-clause 20.6.

Against this background, the CA (like the HC before it) went too far to suggest that, because sub-clause 20.7 does not expressly refer to binding decisions of a DAB, a failure to comply with a binding decision may not be referred to arbitration. Sub-clause 20.7 was not intended to imply any such limitation.\textsuperscript{45}

3. The CA misinterpreted sub-clause 20.6 in three respects

(a) The CA misinterpreted sub-clause 20.6 as requiring a rehearing of a dispute on the merits

Having concluded—incorrectly—that sub-clause 20.7 implies that a party may not refer a non-final and binding DAB decision to arbitration, the CA, like the HC below, concluded that a reference to arbitration under sub-clause 20.6 necessarily requires a full hearing on the merits, as:

“... it seems quite plain to us that a reference to arbitration under sub-cl. 20.6 of the 1999 FIDIC Conditions of Contract in respect of a binding but non-final DAB decision is clearly in the form of a rehearing so that the entirety of the parties’ dispute(s) can finally be resolved afresh.”\textsuperscript{46} [Emphasis in original.]

The CA appears to have been led to this conclusion, first, by its erroneous interpretation of sub-clause 20.7 as being the sole means of enforcing a DAB decision (as discussed above) and, secondly, because sub-clause 20.6, second paragraph, confers on an arbitral tribunal “full power to open up, review and revise ... any decision of the DAB, relevant to the dispute”.\textsuperscript{47}

Having arrived at this conclusion, the CA is then obliged to address certain recently published ICC awards where arbitral tribunals have enforced non-final decisions of the engineer or of a DAB, namely, ICC Case No 10619 (concerning a binding but non-final engineer’s decision under

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} The same applies to sub-clause 20.7 of the FIDIC Conditions of Contract for Plant and Design-Build, 1999 (“Yellow Book”), and for EPC/Turnkey Projects, 1999 (“Silver Book”), as that sub-clause is worded in identical terms there.

\textsuperscript{46} CA judgment, [66]: Mr Gillion’s remark about the HC judgment applies equally to the CA judgment: “by reading too much into sub-clause 20.7 and its distinction with sub-clause 20.6, the High Court also ends up misconstruing sub-clause 20.6”: Gillion, op cit. n. 2, p. 396.

\textsuperscript{47} CA judgment [54] (citing to Ellis Baker et al., FIDIC Contracts: Law and Practice (2009) and HC judgment, [34] and [35]).
clause 67 of the Fourth Edition of the Red Book \(^{48}\)) and a decision published in a newsletter dated September 2010 of the Dispute Board Federation ("DBF").

The CA notes that ICC Case No 10619 was an "interim award" \(^{49}\) and the decision published in the DBF newsletter is a "partial award" \(^{50}\) and that, in each award, it was made clear that the rights of the party against whom the award was made to have the underlying decision opened up, reviewed and revised in the same arbitration were reserved. \(^{51}\)

Accordingly, in addition to concluding that a reference to arbitration under sub-clause 20.6 requires a full hearing on the merits, the CA concludes (as had the HC before it\(^{52}\)) that:

"... both ICC Case No 10619 and the case mentioned in the September 2010 DBF newsletter suggest that the practical response is for the successful party in the DAB proceedings to secure an interim or partial award from the arbitral tribunal in respect of the DAB decision pending the consideration of the merits of the parties' dispute(s) in the same arbitration." \(^{53}\) [Emphasis added.]

However, the CA’s reliance on the second paragraph of sub-clause 20.6 as justifying the need for a hearing on the merits is mistaken. The first paragraph of sub-clause 20.6 contains a complete ICC arbitration clause in itself, providing for the arbitration of disputes in respect of non-final decisions of the DAB under the ICC Rules. \(^{54}\) Accordingly, under that paragraph, an arbitral tribunal is—like normally any arbitral tribunal under an arbitration clause—empowered to order the enforcement of the contract in which it is contained. \(^{55}\) Nothing more is required for it to be able to do so.

\(^{48}\) This case has been the subject of an article by the author, "Enforcement by an Arbitral Award of a Binding but not Final Engineer’s or DAB’s Decision under the FIDIC Conditions" [2009] ICLR 414. Mr Gillon says that, in that case, the claimant was seeking "provisional relief" under Art 25 of the ICC Rules (Gillon, op. cit. n. 2, p. 408). While this was indeed one of the grounds relied upon by the claimant, it was rejected by the tribunal which preferred to rely on the "law of the contract", see (2008) ICC ICArb Bull No 2, 89, 88-89 and the author’s article, p. 421.

\(^{49}\) CA judgment, [60].

\(^{50}\) CA judgment, [65].

\(^{51}\) CA judgment, [61] and [65].

\(^{52}\) HC judgment, [58].

\(^{53}\) CA judgment, [66].

\(^{54}\) The first paragraph of sub-clause 20.6 provides as follows:

"Unless settled amicably, any dispute in respect of which the DAB’s decision (if any) has not become final and binding shall be finally settled by international arbitration. Unless otherwise agreed by both Parties:

(a) the dispute shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,

(b) the dispute shall be settled by three arbitrators appointed in accordance with these Rules, and

(c) the arbitration shall be conducted in the language for communications defined in Sub-Clause 1.4 [Law and Language]."

\(^{55}\) In this connection, Art 17 (2) of the ICC Rules provides in relevant part that: "[i]n all cases the Arbitral Tribunal shall take account of the provisions of the contract . . . ."
The second paragraph of sub-clause 20.6 does not detract from, but rather complements, the first paragraph. It provides that, in addition to whatever powers the arbitrator(s) may have under the first paragraph, they shall have full power to open up, review and revise decisions of DABs. In the absence of the second paragraph, it would be unclear whether they would have this supplementary power.

But it is important to appreciate that the second paragraph grants arbitrator(s) powers—it does not impose duties on them. Moreover, their ability to exercise such powers in any given arbitration will necessarily depend upon the claims and counterclaims, if any, and the terms of the TOR, in that arbitration.

Accordingly, the CA, like the HC before it, was wrong to conclude that sub-clause 20.6 places an obligation on arbitrator(s) to review the merits of binding but not final decisions of DABs. The wording of sub-clause 20.6 does not support this conclusion and it was never intended to.

Here the wording of the award itself could not be more apt. The Majority Members had stated that PGN’s submissions: “have the effect of rendering a DAB decision of no binding effect whatsoever until an arbitral award. Such an interpretation is the complete opposite of what the fourth sentence of the fourth paragraph of Clause 20.4 says.” 56

The same may be said of the judgments of the HC and the CA, which adopted PGN’s submissions in this respect.

(b) The CA misinterpreted sub-clause 20.6 as “contemplating a single arbitration where all the existing differences between the parties arising from the DAB decision concerned will be resolved”

Having concluded wrongly that sub-clause 20.6 requires a hearing on the merits, the CA then stated, apparently as a corollary to this conclusion, that sub-clause 20.6 “requires” that all disputes relating to a specific DAB decision must be decided in the same ICC arbitration:

“Where a NOD has been validly filed against a DAB decision by one or both of the parties, and either or both of the parties fail to comply with that decision (which, by virtue of the NOD(s) filed, will be binding but non-final), sub-cl. 20.6 of the 1999 FIDIC Conditions of Contract requires the parties to finally settle their differences in the same arbitration, both in respect of the non-compliance with the DAB decision and in respect of the merits of that decision. In other words, sub-cl. 20.6 contemplates a single arbitration where all the existing differences between the parties arising from the DAB decision concerned will be resolved.” 57 [Underlining added: italics in original.]

The CA refers to no authority or other ground to support this conclusion but states that it is “consistent with the plain phraseology of sub-cl. 20.6”, which requires “the parties’ dispute” in respect of a binding but not final

56 Award, [42]. Indeed, the CA recognises—but without resolving—a difficulty: “The drawback . . . is that the DAB decision becomes of little immediate value”. CA judgment, [56].

57 CA judgment, [67].
DAB decision to be “finally settled by international arbitration”. The CA says: “Sub-clause 20.6 clearly does not provide for separate proceedings to be brought by the parties before different arbitration panels even if each party is dissatisfied with the same DAB decision for different reasons.”

However, sub-clause 20.6 simply provides that any dispute in respect of which a DAB decision has not become final and binding “shall be finally settled by international arbitration”, i.e., by a particular procedure for dispute settlement. While no party is likely to want to bring more arbitrations than necessary, sub-clause 20.6 does not restrict the number of arbitrations that a party may bring in respect of any one dispute.

(c) The CA failed to appreciate that, as PGN had referred to sub-clause 20.6 as a defence and not as a counterclaim, the arbitral tribunal was without power to grant PGN affirmative relief under that sub-clause.

Having concluded that, in the case of a reference to arbitration under sub-clause 20.6, the Arbitral Tribunal had no power to open up, review and revise the Adjudicator’s decision . . .”

CRW argued that as PGN had not submitted a counterclaim, the Arbitral Tribunal had no power to open up, review and revise the Adjudicator’s decision. On the other hand, PGN had argued that it had such power and it had elaborated at length on the alleged errors in that decision.

According to the CA, the Majority Members concluded that, as CRW had not filed a counterclaim, PGN’s request for an award to open up, review and revise the DAB’s decision was a defence to CRW’s claim for immediate payment of the amount of the DAB’s decision. As the Majority Members decided to enforce the DAB’s decision, they rejected that defence, while reserving in their final award PGN’s right to commence a new arbitration to revise the DAB’s decision.

Having concluded that the Majority Members did not have the power under sub-clause 20.6 to issue a final award without assessing the merits of PGN’s defence and the DAB’s decision as a whole, the CA added that they should have directed PGN to file a counterclaim: “If [the Majority Members] genuinely believed that PGN had to file a counterclaim in order to pursue its objection to making payment . . . , it was certainly open to

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56 CA judgment, [68].
57 CA judgment, [69].
58 CA judgment, [70].
59 CA judgment, [71].
60 CA judgment, [72].
61 CA judgment, [73]. See Section III, above.
62 CA judgment, [82].
them to direct that such a counterclaim be filed. They did not, however, do so . . ."65

Again, the CA is mistaken: under the ICC Rules, it is solely for the respondent in the arbitration to decide whether to file a counterclaim,66 which it must normally do when it files its Answer and which will increase the costs payable by the parties (or, at least, the respondent) to the ICC.67 The Arbitral Tribunal has no role in the matter and, moreover—as mentioned above—after the TOR have been signed at the beginning of an ICC arbitration, a party cannot introduce a new claim or counterclaim into an arbitration without the Arbitral Tribunal’s authorisation.68

Thus, once again, the CA failed to take account of the particular rules—the ICC Rules—which governed this arbitration.

4. The CA misinterpreted the effect of the Award

The CA found that the Majority Members exceeded their jurisdiction as (according to the CA) the Majority Members did not have the power under sub-clause 20.6 to make a “Final Award” without assessing the merits of PGN’s defence and the DAB’s decision as a whole.69

In arriving at this conclusion, the CA attached particular importance to the fact that the Majority Members had issued a “Final Award”, rather than an interim award or partial award.

As the award of the Majority Members was called a “Final Award” (as it concluded the arbitration), the CA was unwilling to accept that PGN’s right to commence a separate arbitration had been adequately reserved—the CA did not seem to understand, or at least accept, that a final award enforcing a non-final, binding DAB decision does not change or affect the non-final, and merely binding, nature of that decision.70 Indeed, the CA was unwilling to accept—though PGN had failed to file a counterclaim—that PGN should have to begin a separate arbitration to challenge the DAB decision.

“In this regard, counsel for CRW ingeniously suggested to this court that the Final Award was not in effect ‘final’ since the Majority Members had expressly reserved PGN’s right to commence a separate arbitration to challenge the Arbitrator’s decision. We

65 CA judgment, [83].
66 See Art 5 (5) of the ICC Rules. The Arbitral Tribunal is, naturally, required to comply with the ICC Rules, see Art 15 (1) of the ICC Rules.
67 See Art 50 (2) of the ICC Rules. Indeed, one reason a respondent may be disinclined to file a counterclaim is precisely to avoid the additional costs this would entail.
68 Art 19 of the ICC Rules.
69 CA judgment, [82].
70 Contending that the Arbitral Tribunal should have opened up, reviewed and revised the DAB’s decision pursuant to sub-clause 20.6, the CA said: “PGN justifiably expected that evidence on the merits of the Adjudicator’s decision would only be presented at a subsequent hearing to be fixed by the Arbitral Tribunal.” CA judgment, [90]. However, the CA ignored the fact that the scope of the ICC arbitration was fixed by the TOR, which had been signed shortly after the arbitration began (on 17 June 2009), and, as PGN had failed to file a counterclaim that was included in the TOR, there was no basis for the Tribunal to grant PGN any affirmative relief and, thus, to receive evidence on the merits of the decision.
cannot accept this submission... It is as plain as a pikestaff that the Majority Members meant ‘final’ to mean ‘conclusive or unalterable’ [emphasis added in bold italics]... The purported reservation of PGN’s rights to commence a fresh arbitration before another arbitral tribunal to review the merits of the Adjudicator’s decision was odd, to say the least.\textsuperscript{77} [The italics are in the original; the bold italics are a quotation from the award.]

While recognising that a binding but non-final decision of a DAB may be enforced by an interim or partial award,\textsuperscript{78} the CA appears to have difficulty accepting that such decision may be enforced by a final award even though the Majority Members had expressly reserved PGN’s right, in the award, to commence an arbitration to open up, review and revise the award.

The CA’s difficulty is hard to understand. The final award merely declared that the DAB decision was binding on PGN and, thus, to be given immediate effect by it until such time (if any) as it was opened up, reviewed and revised in arbitration. It clarified the parties’ rights in the “interim” pending a final decision by arbitration. This was the effect of the final award.\textsuperscript{73}

The only difference between the final award in this case and the interim and partial awards in the other cases referred to by the CA is that, in this case, because it was a final award (as it would conclude the arbitration), PGN would have to begin a new arbitration in order to have the DAB decision opened up, reviewed and revised, whereas, in the other cases, the engineer’s decision or DAB decision could be opened up, reviewed and revised in the same arbitration.\textsuperscript{74}

But this difference was simply due to PGN’s failure to file a counterclaim. As PGN had not done so, its reference to sub-clause 20.6 was merely a defence and, thus, the Arbitral Tribunal was unable to grant PGN affirmative relief. Had PGN wanted the DAB’s decision to be opened up, reviewed and revised in the same arbitration, it should have submitted a counterclaim on the basis of sub-clause 20.6, in accordance with Article 5 (5) of the ICC Rules. This could have saved it the time and cost of beginning, and having to pursue, a second arbitration. But PGN neglected to do so.

Accordingly, the Arbitral Tribunal was justified in proceeding in the manner that it did, that is, issuing a final award ordering PGN to pay immediately the amount of the DAB’s decision while expressly reserving...

\textsuperscript{77} CA judgment, [84].
\textsuperscript{78} See Section IV, B, 3 (a), above.
\textsuperscript{73} A somewhat analogous issue is whether a provisional measure should be enforced by an arbitral award. As to this, a leading authority states: “The better view is that provisional measures should be and are enforceable as arbitral awards... Provisional measures are “final” in the sense that they dispose of a request for relief pending the conclusion of the arbitration.” Gary B Born, \textit{International Commercial Arbitration} (2000), Vol II, p. 2023. Much the same is true of the enforcement by an arbitral award of a binding, but not final, DAB decision.
\textsuperscript{74} This discussion of interim, partial and final awards is based on the definition given to these terms by the ICC Rules, see Art 2 (iii) and other Articles. As Mr Gillion correctly notes (Gillon, \textit{op. cit.} n. 2, p. 407), the law of the country where the award is to be enforced is also relevant and should always be consulted, as is the law of the country where the award is made.
PGN’s right to commence a new arbitration to open up, review and revise the DAB’s decision. As PGN had not submitted a counterclaim, there was nothing more for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide and, therefore, it had to issue a final award\textsuperscript{75} whilst reserving PGN’s rights.\textsuperscript{76}

Once again, there is nothing in the arbitral award to criticise in this respect.

V. CONCLUSION

Since the First Edition of the Red Book was published in 1957, it has provided for the final settlement of disputes by ICC arbitration. Most accept that arbitrators tend to be more familiar with international commerce, including international arbitration, and standard forms of contract and practices in individual industries, like the construction industry, than many national courts. Indeed, one of the well-recognised advantages of arbitration is that it enables disputes in a particular industry to be decided by persons familiar with that industry.

This case provides further reason why international construction disputes should be allowed to be settled finally by international arbitration with only the most minimal court oversight. The CA held that the Majority Members had exceeded their jurisdiction by failing to consider the merits of the DAB’s decision before making their final award.\textsuperscript{77} On the contrary, the Majority Members could well have exceeded their jurisdiction had they done so, given that the only claim before them, included in the TOR, was that of CRW. In reality, the Majority Members understood sub-clauses 20.4 to 20.7 of the 1999 Red Book very well and rendered a perfectly sound and concise award. On the other hand, the Singapore courts appear to have misunderstood those sub-clauses and the CA misinterpreted the TOR and the ICC Rules as well. Those courts should have left this award alone.

\textsuperscript{75} Award, [53].
\textsuperscript{76} Award, [85].
\textsuperscript{77} CA judgment, [85].